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IV. Selective Service
A.

Conscientious Objection-Ehiert v. United States, No. 21,
930 (9th Cir., Sept. 11, 1968); Blades v. United
States, 407 F.2d 1397 (9th Cir. 1969).

Although the Selective Service statutes and regulations are being
challenged on many fronts, probably no provisions have been examined more closely than those relating to the deferment of conscientious
objectors.' Section 456(j) of the Selective Service Act provides for the
deferment of conscientious objectors:
Nothing contained in this [Act] shall be construed to require any
person to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed
forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training
and belief,2 is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in
any form.
The language of section 456(j) suggests that the right to claim
exemption was intended to be available without limitation, up to the
moment of induction. The courts, however, have held that conscientious objection, like all other deferments, is a matter of legislative grace,
and, as such, is subject to the limitations of the Selective Service Regulations.'
Specifically, section 456(j) is subject to the procedural requirements of section 1625.2 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 4 which
provides:
[T]he classification of a registrant shall not be reopened after the
local board has mailed to such registrant an Order to Report...
unless the local board first specifically finds there has been a
change in the registrant's status resulting from circumstances over
which the registranthad no control.5
Whether or not a conscientious objector claimant can secure a reopening6 of his classification and receive a hearing on the merits of his
1.

United States v. Gearey, 368 F.2d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,

389 U.S. 959 (1967).
2.

50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (Supp. IV, 1969).

3. Keene v. United States, 266 F.2d 378, 383 (10th Cir. 1959); see, e.g.,
United States v. Taylor, 351 F.2d 228, 230 (6th Cir. 1965); Boyd v. United States,
269 F.2d 607, 611 (9th Cir. 1959); United States v. Schoebel, 201 F.2d 31 (7th
Cir 1953). Contra, United States v. Underwood, 151 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Pa. 1955);
United States v. Crawford, 119 F. Supp. 729, 730 (N.D. Cal. 1954). See generally
Note, Pre-Induction Availability of the Right to Claim Conscientious Objector Exemption, 72 YALE L.J. 1459 (1963).
4. See note 3 supra.
5. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1969).

6.

When a local board reopens a registrant's classification it must consider the

classification anew.

The registrant has the same rights of personal appearance and
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claim by the local board, subsequent to issuance of a notice to report,
depends on a judicial interpretation of that regulation.
This Note will deal with the two legal problems attendant to a
registrant's attempt to obtain conscientious objector reclassification by
the local board between the time notice of induction is issued and the time
that the date of induction has passed. First, is the crystalization of

conscientious objector beliefs a circumstance beyond the registrant's
control, thus enabling the local board under section 1625.2 to reopen
the registrant's classification; 7 second, once the first question is answered in the affirmative, at what time prior to the induction proceedings must that claim be asserted."
Conscientious Objector Beliefs: A Circumstance Beyond
The Registrant's Control
The Ninth Circuit, in Ehlert v. United States,9 brought the con-

scientious objector within the provision of section 1625.2 by holding
that a claim of conscientious objection could mature or crystalize after
a registrant had received his induction notice, and that this may be a
circumstance over which the registrant had no control. In so holding,
the Ninth Circuit aligned itself with the Second Circuit's ruling in
United States v. Gearey,10 where the court stated that a registrant
who raises his conscientious objector claim promptly after it matures-even if this occurs after an induction notice is sent but before actual induction-[is] entitled to have his application considered by the Local Board. 1
The facts in Ehlert show that the day before his scheduled inappeal as he had before he was classified. If the local board reopens the classification,
any order to report for induction must be cancelled. 32 C.F.R. § 1624.11-.14 (1969).
7. This Note will not concern the registrant who, although he may be a conscientious objector prior to issuance of a notice to report, fails to assert his claim
until after notice of induction has issued. Under section 1625.2, such a registrant
cannot obtain a reopening of his classification. Boyd v. United States, 269 F.2d 607
(9th Cir. 1959).
8. This Note will not concern a claim of conscientious objection first raised
after induction into the armed forces. "[CIlassification functions of the local board
cease with induction .... ." Palmer v. United States, 401 F.2d 226, 227-28 (9th
Cir. 1968). As the court said in Boyd v. United States, 269 F.2d 607, 612 (9th Cir.
1959), "there must be some end to the time when registrants can raise and re-raise an
alleged right to review," and that end the Ninth Circuit has ruled, is after the date of
induction has passed. Blades v. United States, 407 F.2d 1397, 1399 (9th Cir. 1969);
Palmer v. United States, 401 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1968). It should be noted that these
claims may be presented to the appropriate military authorities; they are no longer
the responsibility of the local board. See Dep't of Defense Directive No. 1300.6 ASD
(M&RA) (May 10, 1968), in SELECTIVE SERVICE L. REP. 2325.
9. No. 21,930 (9th Cir., Sept. 11, 1968) (reheard en banc, decision pending).
10. 368 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 959 (1967).
11. Id. at 150.
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duction Ehlert wrote the board 2 requesting conscientious objector
status, "stating that he had been 'unable to make a decision of such
moment until faced with the absolute necessity to do so.' "'s He reported for, and thereafter refused, induction, whereupon he was directed to report to the local board. Subsequent to his date of induction,
Ehlert did report to his local board and completed a formal application
for conscientious objector status, SSS Form No. 150.
The district court held that "as a matter of law . . . changes in
status involving conscientious objection were not beyond the control of
the registrant."' 4 Therefore, under section 1625.2 of the Selective
Service Regulations, the local board could not reopen the registrant's
classification; on this basis, Ehlert was convicted of refusing induction.
On appeal, Ehlert set forth three arguments in support of his position. The first argument focused upon a careful scrutinization of sections 1625.1 and 1625.2.1" Section 1625.1(b) provides that the registrant shall report any fact to the local board that might result in the
registrant being placed in a different classification.' 6 Ehlert contended
that these two regulations, as worded, "[made] it apparent that they
were designed to include situations involving conscientious objector
status.' 7 Neither of the aforementioned regulations, claimed the appellant, excluded conscientious objection "from the spectrum of circumstances which may be beyond the registrant's control."'"
Second, he
argued that the wording of section 456(j) "sets forth a strong policy of
deferment for conscientious objectors." 9 To exclude conscientious objector claims from the proviso of section 1625.2 would be to thwart
the reasons for the enactment of the legislation. 20 Such a construc12. There was no mention of the time that the letter was actually received by
the board. The government, however, failed to claim that the letter was not timely
filed.
13. Brief for Appellant at 2, Ehlert v. United States, No. 21,930 (9th Cir.,
Sept. 11, 1968) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant].
14. Ehlert v. United States, No. 21, 930 (9th Cir., Sept. 11, 1968).
15. Brief for Appellant at 6-7.
16. "Each classified registrant and each person who has filed a request for the
registrant's deferment shall, within 10 days after it occurs, report to the local board
in writing any fact that might result in the registrant being placed in a different
classification such as, but not limited to, any change in his occupational, marital, military, or dependency status, or in his physical condition."
32 C.F.R. § 1625.1(b)

(1969) (emphasis added).
17. Brief for Appellant at 6.
18. Id. at 7.
19.

Id.

20.

See United States v. Gearey, 368 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1966).

See also United

States v. Underwood, 151 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Pa. 1955), where the court stated that

"[ilt is plain that a person meeting the conditions of [section 456(j)] is not to be
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tion "might result in a conscientious objector having to perform combatant training and service. 2 1 Finally, he argued that to hold as a
matter of law that conscientious objection is not within the proviso of
of section 1625.2, would result in "a lack of uniformity [in the] treatment of conscientious objector claims.1 22 This claim was based on the
fact that claims may be presented before an induction order is mailed,23
and after induction into the armed forces. 24 The armed services, however, will not consider a claim for exemption that has matured prior to
induction. 25 Therefore, he argued:
[I]f such claims can never be asserted before the local board
after an Order to Report has been sent, one who has a valid
claim maturing during that time would have no remedy. This
would be contrary to the "strong congressional policy to afford
meticulous procedural protections to applicants who claim to be
conscientious objectors." 26
The Government's position was that the construction urged by the
appellant was a practical impossibility, and "would clearly impair the
efficiency of the [Selective Service] System to an extent not required
. . . by the enactment of Section 456(j). 2 7 The case law indicates
that the Government's position has been accepted by the Sixth2" and
Seventh 29 Circuits, while the appellant's position has been upheld in
subjected to combatant training and service. This privilege is not to be defeated by
procedural regulations. Nowhere in the Act does it provide that unless the registrant
makes his claim before notice of induction he thereafter waives his right to the
privilege." Id. at 876. In a district court case, United States v. Crawford, 119 F.
Supp. 729 (N.D. Cal. 1954), the court stated that "[wihile regulation 1625.2 is
not invalid on its face, it can have no applicability to a claim of conscientious objection, whenever made, so as to deprive the objector of a hearing at which he may
prove his good faith." Id. at 730.
21. Brief for Appellant at 7. But see United States v. Freeman, 388 F.2d 246,
248-49 (7th Cir. 1967), suggesting that a sincere claimant for conscientious objector
status would not accept induction "under any circumstances." A sincere claimant
would refuse induction, risking possible imprisonment.
22. Brief for Appellant at 7.
23. See 32 C.F.R. §§ 1625.1-.14 (1969).
24. See Dep't of Defense Directive No. 1300.6 ASD (M&RA) (May 10, 1968),
in SELECTIVE SERVIcE L. REP. 2325.

25. Id.
26. Brief for Appellant at 8, quoting United States v. Gearey, 368 F.2d 144, 150
(2d Cir. 1966).
27. Brief for Appellee at 9, Ehlert v. United States, No. 21,930 (9th Cir.,
Sept. 11, 1968).
28. See United States v. Jennison, 402 F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1968); United States
v. Taylor, 351 F.2d 228 (6th Cir. 1965).
29. Porter v. United States, 334 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1964); United States v.
Schoebel, 201 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1953). See also Davis v. United States, 374 F.2d 1
(5th Cir. 1967) (semble); United States v. AI-Majied Muhammad, 364 F.2d 223
(4th Cir. 1966) (semble).
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The Ninth Circuit, prior to Ehlert,
the Second 30 and Tenth Circuits."'
32
stand.
definite
a
taken
not
had
Two leading cases rejecting the crystalization theory are United
States v. Schoebel33 and United States v. Jennison.8 4 In Schoebel, the
Seventh Circuit stated that the crystalization theory was a "strained
The court reainterpretation of the regulation [section 1625.2]."13
soned that conscientious objection was simply not a circumstance over
which a registrant had no control. In Jennison, the Sixth Circuit indicated that the crystalization theory was unsound because it did not
accurately reflect the processes of decisionmaking. The court argued
that the theory places too much emphasis on the time element of
"crystalization"; conscientious objection is not subject to instant "crystalization," but results from a long period of internalization.30
In both the aforementioned cases the courts' reasoning is subject
to criticism. First, the phrase "conscientious objection," by definition,
indicates that it is something over which a registrant has no control.
In the Ninth Circuit's words,
[c]onscientious objection itself would seem to be a contradiction
of control. It is difficult to see how one could in his thinking
depart at will from a conviction which honestly is dictated by conscience. Conversely, a belief conveniently subject to the control
37
of the holder would hardly seem to be conscientiously entertained.
Second, the Jennison decision failed to recognize the import and effect that a pending induction may have. The decision to claim conscientious objection is a serious decision, requiring reflection and introspection. The registrant who is unsure in his own mind whether or
not he is actually a conscientious objector cannot in all honesty lay
claim to the exemption. For such a registrant, notification that he has
actually been drafted may be the catalyst that crystalizes his views. In
30. See United States v. Stafford, 389 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968); United States
v. Gearey, 368 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1966).
31. See Keene v. United States, 266 F.2d 378 (10th Cir. 1959).
32. Compare Parrott v. United States, 370 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1966), and Boyd
v. United States, 269 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1959) (two cases indicating disapproval of
the theory of crystalization), with Boswell v. United States, 390 F.2d 181 (9th Cir.
1968) (failure of a board to give registrant a Form No. 150 and allow him to file it held
arbitrary, capricious and denial of due process even though request was not received
until after order to report mailed), Dugdale v. United States, 389 F.2d 482 (9th Cir.
1968), and Briggs v. United States, 397 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1968) (where the court
refused to commit itself, expressly reserving the choice of rules).
33. 201 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1953).
34. 402 F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1968).
35. 201 F.2d at 33.
36. Accord, Davis v. United States 374 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1967), where the court
stated that "[blelated development of conscientious objection is not a change in status
beyond the control of the registrant." Id. at 4.
37. Ehlert v. United States, No. 21,930, at 2 (9th Cir., Sept. 11, 1968).
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the words of the Second Circuit:
The realization that induction is pending, and that he may soon be
asked to take another's life, may cause a young8 man finally to
crystalize and articulate his once vague sentiments.3
The language set forth in section 456(j) is clear and unequivocal;
one who is conscientiously opposed to war in any form should not be
subject to combatant training and service. 9 There is nothing in the
language of the section to indicate that there is a time limitation upon
the exercise of that exemption. Section 1625.2, a procedural regulation enacted to carry out the provisions of the Selective Service Act,
should not be construed so as to thwart the very reasons for the enactment of the exemption.40 With the Ehlert decision that conscientious
objection can constitute a circumstance beyond the registrant's control,
as specified in section 1625.2, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a construction consistent with the unequivocal language of section 456(j).
A registrant whose conscientious objector views crystalize after notice
of induction has been sent should have an opportunity to present his

claim to the local board. The local board then has the responsibility
of making the factual determinations of when the registrant's beliefs
matured, whether there has been a change in status, and whether the
crystalization of those beliefs was beyond his control.41 Failure of the
local board to afford such consideration to a registrant would constitute
a denial of due process.42 If the board concludes that the registrant's
beliefs matured only after receipt of his notice to report, and in addition
"that his beliefs qualify him for classification as a conscientious objector.

. .

he would be entitled to be reclassified by the Local Board." 43

The Ninth Circuit has reheard Ehlert en banc; but its decision, at
the time of this writing, has not been announced. Since the crystalization theory is sound, it is hoped that the court will be persuaded by the
logic of its former holding.
The Timely Filing
Because the local board is not obligated to consider a claim of
conscientious objection filed after the date of induction has passed,4 4 it
is essential that the registrant file his claim for conscientious objector
38. United States v. Gearey, 368 F.2d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 1966).
39. 50 U.S.C. APP. § 456(j) (Supp. IV, 1969).
40. See generally Note, Pre-Induction Availability of the Right to Claim Conscientious Objector Exemption, 72 YALE LJ. 1459 (1963).
41. United States v. Gearey, 368 F.2d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 1966).
42. See id.; United States v. Stafford, 389 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968); United
States v. Blaisdell, 294 F. Supp. 1303 (S.D. Me. 1968); United States v. Hench, 292
F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
43. United States v. Gearey, 368 F.2d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 1966).
44. See note 8 supra.
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status prior to that time. All too often, the ordinary conscientious objector, unfamiliar with the applicable formalities of claiming exemption,
will fail to present a judicially cognizable claim. The Second Circuit
and the Ninth Circuit are in disagreement on when a claim of conscientious objection is deemed to have been filed.4 5
The Second Circuit, in United States v. Stafford, 46 extended the
scope of their Gearey decision4 7 by a liberal interpretation of what
constitutes a timely filing of a claim of conscientious objection. In
Stafford, the registrant reported to the induction station on the day of
his scheduled induction. At that time he presented to the processing
officer a letter claiming conscientious objector status; thereafter, he refused induction. The evidence indicated that he had earlier gone to the
local board, intending to give them the letter; the board, however, was
closed. The registrant's letter was never sent to the local board, but
instead was forwarded to the United States Attorney's office. The
board was never informed that the registrant had made a written claim of
conscientious objector status before he refused induction. Approximately two months after induction, the registrant was allowed to file
an SSS Form No. 150, a formal application for conscientious objector
status. The board met to consider the claim but rejected it.
Stafford relied on the Second Circuit's ruling in Gearey, contending that there had been a change in status beyond his control, and that
he qualified as a conscientious objector. The Government tried to
distinguish this case from Gearey on the grounds that a claim for conscientious objection should have been made at the local board and not
at the induction center. The court rejected the government's contention and held that the request was both sufficient and timely. "[W]e
do not think that a legally untutored registrant should be penalized for
his failure to distinguish between the two agencies. '48 The court further stated that "'[r]egistrants are not to be treated as though they
were engaged in informal litigation assisted by counsel.' ,,49 Stafford
thus holds that an informal letter handed to the processing officer,
merely stating a claim of conscientious objection, constitutes a timely
filing, imposing upon the local board the obligation to review the registrant's claim according to the procedure outlined in Gearey.
Last year the Ninth Circuit was presented with a case, Blades v.
United States,50 having facts somewhat similar to those in Stafford.
45. Compare United States v. Stafford, 389 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), with
Blades v. United States, 407 F.2d 1397 (9th Cir. 1969).
46. 389 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968).
47. See text accompanying notes 10-11 supra.
48. 389 F.2d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 1968).

49. Id., quoting Simmons v. United States, 348 U.S. 397, 404 n.5 (1955).
50. 407 F.2d 1397 (9th Cir. 1969).
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On the night before his scheduled induction, Blades filled out and
mailed SSS Form No. 150 to his local board. The letter was postmarked August 30, 1967, the date of his scheduled induction, and was
received by the board on August 31, 1967, one day after the date
of his scheduled induction. He reported to the induction center, refused to step forward, and instead handed the induction officer a
typed, signed, statement, which read in part:
I am opposed to participation in a war in any form by virtue of
religious training and belief. I intend to secure judicial review of
my First Amendment rights to conscientious objector status and of
the denial of due process of law which has occurred in the issuance
of the order of induction, the application of the selective service
regulations case, and
51 the consideration of my application for I-0
[sic] classification.
The appellant argued two points: (1) that the mailing of the
Form 150 to the local board constituted a timely filing, and, in the
alternative, (2) that the letter given to the induction officer was a
sufficient and timely request for conscientious objector status. The
court rejected both contentions and affirmed the conviction.
The court, in rejecting the appellant's first contention, held that a
150 Form "has not been 'filed' with or 'returned to' a local board until
it has actually been received." 52 Here, the form was not actually received until the day after the registrant's scheduled induction. The
second contention raised the issue decided in Stafford, namely, whether
the letter handed to the induction officer constituted a timely filing.
The court held that giving the letter to the officer was not a sufficient
notice to the board and did not constitute a timely filing. The court
stated that in order for a claim to be timely filed, "the draft board must
acquire actual notice of a conscientious objector claim in time to at
least consider whether the classification should be reopened."5 3 The
court expressly stated that "[t]o the extent that United States v. Stafford,
is contrary to this conclusion, we are not inclined to follow it."' 54 The
court refused to follow Stafford because in their words,
[i]f the decision in Stafford were followed, there would be an
opportunity for a registrant to create an ex post facto defect in
51. id. at 1399.
52. id. The regulations are not explicit on this point. The court reasoned that
"the regulations frequently authorize the board to mail documents to registrants (e.g.,
32 C.F.R. §§ 1621.9, 1623.1(a)), and provide that the period allowed a person to
perform any act or duty required of him shall be computed as beginning on the day
after the notice to him is mailed or posted. 32 C.F.R. §§ 1641.6. See also 32 C.F.R.
§ 1641.3. [But] the regulations do not speak in terms of registrants using the mails.
Rather, they must 'return' or 'file' the documents (e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 10(a), 1623.1
(a))." 407 F.2d at 1399.
53. Id. at 1400.

54. Id.
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the induction process that might delay or defeat it indefinitely. 55
Furthermore, the court stated an officer at an induction center has no
power or authority to reopen a registrant's classification and therefore
a letter served on him could not constitute a timely filing.5"
With the Blades decision, the Ninth Circuit has taken the position
that a claim of conscientious objection, in order to be timely filed, must
at least be received by the local board before the time for induction.
It is important to note that there is language in Blades that would seem
to add the additional requirement that the notice be received by the local
board in time for the board to at least consider whether the classification
should be reopened.5 7 The ambiguity and uncertainty that would result from any such requirement is obvious; for example, would the
notice not be timely filed even if it were actually received at the board
office on a Tuesday, but the induction was scheduled for Thursday
and the next board meeting was not to be held until Friday? Such a
conclusion would mean that no matter when he mailed his petition,
the registrant's right of review would be subject to the uncertain chance
that the next board meeting will precede the time for his induction.
Such a conclusion is absurd, but follows from a literal interpretation
of the court's language. A close reading of the Blades decision, however, leads to the more logical conclusion that the Ninth Circuit intended to establish a specific, ascertainable, and almost always predictable point of time, which, if it precedes the time for induction, will
trigger the registrant's right of review: the time when the notice is received by the local board.58 The adoption of this conclusion furthers
the congressional intent to permit the conscientious objector the legally
protected right to abstain from participation in any combatant activities.
55. Id.
56. Id.

57. 407 F.2d 1400.
58.
CLAIMING

See also

CALIFORNIA

CONSCIENTIOUS

HEADQUARTERS

OBJECTOR

STATUS,

OF

SELECTIVE

OPERATIONS

SERVICE,

REGISTRANTS

MEMORANDUM

(May 29,

1969), referring to LOCAL BOARD MEMORANDUM No. 64 & 41. Section 7 of the
Operations Memorandum provides that "[i]f the completed 150 Form is returned before the induction date and there will be a regularly scheduled meeting of the local
board before the induction date the SSS Form 150 shall be reviewed by the local
board. If the form is returned prior to the induction date and there will be no
scheduled meeting of the local board before the induction date, the registrant's induction shall be postponed so that the local board can consider the information contained in the form at a regularly scheduled meeting. If a courtesy interview is
deemed appropriate, the registrant should be notified of the time and place of the
courtesy interview and if necessary his induction postponed to accomplish the interview." Section 12(b) however, states that "[ilf the form is returned on the date
scheduled for induction or after the induction date, its return is not timely and no
postponement is necessary" (emphasis added).
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The Ninth Circuit, in Ehlert v. United States,59 has tentatively accepted the crystalization theory, as formulated by the Second Circuit
in United States v. Gearey. Recently, the Second Circuit, in United
States v. Stafford, extended the scope of their Gearey decision by holding that a claim of conscientious objection first raised at the induction
center, but prior to refusal of induction, constitutes a timely filing, and
is sufficient to trigger a registrant's right to review. This holding extends the crystalization theory to its logical conclusion: A claim
asserted prior to induction (or refusal of induction), is entitled to
consideration. The Ninth Circuit, however, in Blades v. United States,
refused to follow Stafford, but adhered instead to the procedural formalities of claiming conscientious objection 0 by holding that a processing officer at the induction center does not have the authority to reopen
a classification.
The Ninth Circuit should once again follow the lead of the Second
Circuit and extend the scope of their Ehlert holding. The typical
registrant is likely to be untutored and unfamiliar with the complexities
of the Selective Service System and may not differentiate the board
from the induction center. If a registrant asserts a claim of conscientious objection prior to refusal of induction, he is entitled to have
his claim reviewed, whether this claim be presented at the induction
center or before the local board. The board should consider the claim
according to the procedure outlined in Gearey-determine when the
registrant's beliefs matured, whether there has been a change in status,
and whether the crystalization of those beliefs was beyond his control.
If the registrant presents "prima facie" confirmation, based on obhe is entitled to be reclassified, the local board must
jective facts, that
61
case.
the
reopen
Kenneth N. Schlossberg*
59. No. 21,930 (9th Cir., Sept. 11, 1968) (Merrill & Browning Circuit Judges,
& Kilkenny, District Judge).
60. Other formalities require the registrant to actually make a written request
for a reopening. Hoapili v. United States, 395 F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1968); United
States v. Davis, 284 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. Iowa 1968); United States v. Monroe, 150
F. Supp. 785 (S.D. Cal. 1957). The registrant must submit facts which, if true,
would be a basis for a change in classification. Briggs v. United States, 397 F.2d
370 (9th Cir. 1968); Dugdale v. United States, 389 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1968).
61. See United States v. Baker, 1 SELECTIVE SERVICE L. REP. 3017 (E.D.N.Y.
Feb. 9, 1968). See also Petrie v. United States 407 F.2d 267 (9th Cir. 1969). "The
board is mandated into at least looking at the facts as stated, considering whether it
has previously known those facts when its prior classification was made and considering whether the facts as stated, if true, would to any reasonable mind, justify a
reclassification.'" Id. at 275, quoting United States v. Longworth, 269 F. Supp. 971,
974 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
* Member, Second Year Class.

